The accused and his father lived in a common Hindu family. The father of the accused died on October 4, 1935. The respondent lived and still lived with his widow when she was a minor. The defendant`s father had incurred only a few debts prior to his death, including Rs 16,000 owed to the appellants secured by two promissory notes and a debt of Rs 1,200 to Ramayya and secured by the mortgage. The defendant is a minor, the defendant`s mother, who is guardian, entered into a written agreement to sell the land to the plaintiff for Rs 17,200. The purchase price is to be applied to Rs 16,000 for the repayment of the promissory note and the remaining Rs 1,200 of the mortgage debt to Ramayya. The contract provided that the bill of sale was to be executed, registered and delivered to the appellant at his request and expense. In that case, the Supreme Court of Allahabad ruled that the minor`s old consideration is not valid consideration for a new contract. In the fall of 2001, Young, who was 18 at the time and had lived with her parents all her life, decided she wanted to “move away from [her] parents and be alone.” Young and a friend, Ashley Springer, then a minor, signed an apartment rental agreement with Weaver on September 20, 2001. No adult signed the lease as guarantor. Young was working full-time at a Lowe`s hardware store in Tuscaloosa at the time of the lease. Young paid a $300 bond; The rent for the apartment was $550 per month, and the lease expired on July 31, 2002.
If a minor falsely claims to be an adult and enters into a contract, he or she may be asked to return property in his or her possession that was part of the contract if it is still in his or her custody (not sold/given to someone else or converted) and there is no consideration (money). Otherwise, it would mean the performance of a void contract, such as a miner`s agreement.  Ragan differs factually from this case because Ragan`s situation and condition differed markedly from Young`s. Ragan was emancipated, married and had children; none of these circumstances apply to Young. Ragan`s house adjoined the farmland from which he earned his living; Although Young testified that she worked full-time at Lowe`s while living in the apartment, she also testified that she continued to work there after returning to her parents` home. Unlike Ragan, Young did not need the apartment to keep his job. After all, Ragan and his family did not live with his parents immediately before staying in the house in question, and there is no indication that Ragan and his family could have moved in with his parents if they had not lived in the house. On the other hand, Young had lived with her parents before renting the apartment, and she and her father testified that she could have returned to her parents` home at any time during the period she was renting the apartment. When she left the apartment, Young returned to her parents` house and lived there at the very time Weaver is now trying to collect rent.
In summary, taking into account the evidence highlighted by the de Ragan Court in concluding that the placement in question was a necessity in the present case leads to the conclusion that the placement in question does not constitute a necessity in the present case. The court noted that “the Alabama courts have ruled that placement is a necessity” and that “[Young] was employed full-time at the time the contract was signed.” Immediately after these remarks, the trial court concluded: “The court finds, in the circumstances of the case, that the contract was for necessity.” Facts – The plaintiff, Dharmodas Ghosh, pledged his property to the defendant, a money lender, when he was a minor. The defendant`s lawyer knew the applicant`s age at the time. The plaintiff ultimately paid only 8000 rupees, but refused to pay the remaining amount. The applicant`s mother was his closest girlfriend (legal guardian) at the time; He therefore brought an action against the defendant, arguing that, since he was a minor at the time of the conclusion of the contract, he was not obliged to do so. In this case, the property was rented to a minor due to the necessities of life and further education, and a minor is obliged to rent. Similarly, in Ballinger v. Craig, 95 Ohio App. 545, 121 N.E.2d 66 (1953), the defendants were husband and wife and minors at the time of the purchase of a trailer. Both had jobs. Before purchasing the trailer, however, the accused lived with the husband`s parents.
The Ohio Court of Appeals ruled that the trailer was not a necessity on the facts presented, arguing that no one really questions the fact that somewhere there should be an age limit below which a legally defined minor must be able to terminate his contracts for unnecessary reasons. The law considered this age to be twenty-one years over the centuries. Lawmakers in other states have lowered the age. We suggest that the complainant ask for the amendment he proposes in the legislative halls better than in this court. A recent article in the Indiana Law*25 Journal examines the problem of contractual disabilities of minors and points to three different legal solutions that lead to greater contractual freedom.  The first approach stems from the laws of California and New York, which would allow the parties to submit a proposed contract to a court, thereby depriving the child of the right to object if it is determined that the contract in question is fair. This proposed approach seems extremely impractical in view of the costs and delays that would inevitably accompany the procedure. A second approach would be to establish a rebuttable presumption of lack of competence to replace the strict rule. This alternative would be an open invitation to litigation. The third proposal is a legal procedure that would allow a minor to apply to a court to remove his disability. Under this procedure, a minor should apply to the court only once and not even for each contract, as in the first proposal.
In light of the above-mentioned authorities and the particular circumstances of the present case, we conclude that the trial court erred in deciding that the apartment in question was necessary for Young. Therefore, as a minor, Young is not legally bound by the lease. This result may seem unfair in some respects, but as the Supreme Court *241 stated in Ex parte McFerren: First, the defendant mentioned in the written statement is indeed due to the fact that there was an agreement between the plaintiff and the representative of the defendant`s company and that the insurance actually came into effect after the fire for that reason.